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Abstract 
   The lethality, precision, and global reach of the American way of war has changed the modern 
character of warfare, allowing the US to fight wars with fewer casualties and destruction, 
creating the general perception that conflicts are acceptable, safe, and clean. However, future 
emergence of a multipolar world, and the rise of US’s peer competitors with contradictory 
national interests, will increase the risks of conflict. Given the limited effectiveness of 
conventional warfare against the overwhelming conventional power of American military forces, 
future peer competitors will seek to dislocate its strengths. Furthermore, future trends such as the 
proliferation and affordability of commercial technologies, the increasing civilianization of war, 
and the importance of global media, will provide the leverage that asymmetric competitors can 
use to challenge the US outside the traditional military domain. Such changes will require 
professional military practitioners to have a better understanding of the nature of future warfare. 
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   It’s the end of war as we know it! Future trends indicate that the global strategic 
environment is changing. Those changes drive the future of warfare. The thesis that 
technological advances may make war unnecessary, faster and safer reflects the techno-centric 
American way of war.
1
 In fact, it creates a military asymmetry which leads to a different 
approach to warfare. However, the question is not how technologically advanced a society is, but 
what it does with that technology. This research is an effort to understand emerging new patterns 
of conflict and warfare. The analysis of evolving patterns of warfare gives military and civilian 
leaders the understanding about how future adversaries may think and act, allowing for effective 
strategic planning. Using the past as a prologue, this paper will argue that future warfare’s 
characteristics will be a fusion between the American way of war and the adversary’s 
increasingly innovative trinity of means, methods and actors. As a corollary, warfare will further 
expand beyond the traditional military domain. This essay will first establish the opportunity and 
the motive, by exploring the context for future warfare and exposing the continuities of the 
American way of war. Then, it will address the increasing importance of information, the holistic 
methods, and the role of super empowered individuals, leading to the expansion of warfare 
domains. 
Before starting the discussion about future warfare, we must borrow some assumptions from 
the past. First, there is more to war than warfare.
2
 War, as politic object, expresses a state of 
conflict, which encompasses the use of all instruments of national power, where military power 
is just one available tool. Second, viewing warfare from its binary perspective, objective and 
subjective, Clausewitz describes a historical trend about warfare.
3
 The objective nature of 
warfare, which includes violence, friction, danger, exertion, chance, and uncertainty, is 
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unchangeable. Conversely, the subjective character, its grammar, such as doctrine, technology, 
or people, changes along with the context. Finally, Clausewitz also reminds us about the 
importance of context by stating that every age has its own form of warfare, its own limiting 
conditions, and preconceptions.
4
 In order to unveil the future form of warfare, let’s first have a 
glimpse of tomorrow’s context. 
The release of the study Global Trends 2025 by the United States (US) National Intelligence 
Council helps shedding some light about future trends.
5
 The major assumption in this report is 
that the emergence of a multipolar future brings dramatic changes to the international system. 
Greater diffusion of authority and power could occur, creating a global governance deficit.
6
 This 
is also the opinion of several authors which assert the shift on US hegemony.
7
 Not necessarily 
due to American decline but rather due to the rise of other powers.  Another finding looks upon 
globalization as the pervasive meta-trend which will continue to ensure the diffusion and 
affordability of technology. This trend of technological diffusion, both in proliferation and 
reduced cost, will allow the spread of “warfare on the cheap”, ensuring that any nation, sizable 
organization, or even a super empowered individual can increase its warfare effectiveness. 
Furthermore, Thomas Friedman’s synthesis of the future as “hot, flat, and crowded”, reveals 
the combined trends of global warming, the rise of the middle classes, and rapid population 
growth.
8
 His analysis shows a strong possibility that the future might bring a dangerous 
combination of geopolitical rivalry and environmental crisis. Likewise, the access to resources 
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might pose a renewed emphasis on geography and geopolitics. This combination of physical 
pressures and rapid change of social, cultural, technological and geopolitical change adds greater 
uncertainty to the future.
9
  Hence, the speed and scale of change exacerbates its complexity. 
In hindsight, 2007 exposed the fragmentation of armed violence, the diversification of armed 
actors, and the blurring of boundaries between categories of violence and between their actors 
were among the predominant trends in armed conflicts.
10
 Considering this context, and 
acknowledging the preeminence of the US in the future international system, then investigating 
the traits of America’s approach to combat will facilitate the understanding of its future behavior, 
and also expose some of the continuities which can be exploited by future adversaries.  
The quest for decisive battles, relying on a maneuver and firepower approach with emphasis 
on technology has been the hallmark of the American way of war. The seminal work of Russell 
Weigley establishes the historical patterns of the American way of war as defaulting to a strategy 
of annihilation, which seeks to overthrow the enemy’s military power mainly through 
conventional battles.
11
 Recent conflicts have highlighted the promises of technology thru 
increased lethality, precision, and global reach allowing the US to fight wars with fewer 
casualties. Viewing warfare exclusively in terms of technology may hide the fact that technology 
does not change the essence of war.
12
 Although technological advances introduce asymmetries 
on the battlefield, these advantages have always been temporary and rapidly equalized, either by 
new technologies or fighting tactics. For example, shifting the battlefield to complex 
environments, such as urban or jungle hinders the effectiveness of technology.  
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The improved precision and lethality of the American way of war created the expectations 
for a casualty-free warfare. Furthermore and greatly enhanced by the “CNN syndrome”, it 
revealed an increasing risk-averse society. Some may see this as a weakness worth exploiting. 
Nonetheless, this casualty sensitivity must be seen in context. Whenever society perceives that 
vital interests are at risk it will be more permissive to casualties. Historical examples of World 
War II and the initial response after September 11, 2001 support this claim. Nevertheless, the 
expectation for a quick and decisive victory, although seldom real, is an image that many 
Americans want and expect. 
Finally, the American way of war reflects a symptomatic military approach that concentrates 
on winning battles instead of wars.
13
 Wielding military power autonomously from other 
instruments of power is a consequence of different spheres of responsibility, one for diplomacy 
and one for combat.
14
 Furthermore, browsing through history provides an image of a willful 
forgetfulness syndrome, which tends to universally apply the successes of the American way of 
war, disregarding the context, while forgetting lessons learned from defeat. There were several 
moments in history where a willful amnesia erased the lessons learned from small wars and 
insurgencies. That was the case of the Vietnam War where the lessons learned were ignored and 
deliberately forgotten. According with John Nagl, although the US Army was well aware of the 
deficiencies in counterinsurgency warfare, “it has failed to form a consensus on the lessons of 
Vietnam”.15 Colin Gray explains this behavior by the fact that any society “will not excel in the 
performance of unfamiliar and profoundly unwelcome strategic missions”.16 This expresses the 
frustration with limited wars, particularly counterinsurgent wars, which do not pose a vital threat 
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to the American national interests. Whenever the interests are not vital then there is no public 
support to continue spending “blood and treasure”. These lessons are painfully expressed in 
recent conflicts, revealing some of the US weaknesses when confronted with unconventional 
methods of warfare. For example, the public support for the Iraq war is not overwhelming, and 
the current financial crisis will increase the threshold for further conflicts. 
The previous discussion has provided both the motive and the opportunity for future 
challengers of the US. Now the question is, how will they do it? The history of warfare has an 
enduring cycle which alternates between conventional and unconventional, confrontation and 
dislocation.
17
 The trend of US’s overwhelming military power deters an adversary’s direct 
approach. Hence, if the US wages war on the premise of lower risks, then the best counter 
strategy should be the willingness to take risks. That is, establishing a risk threshold which is 
publicly and politically unacceptable for the US. This indirect approach can be achieved via a 
dislocation strategy, which Liddell Hart defines as, “concentration of strength against 
weakness”,18 leveraging globalization and technological diffusion to affect US’s weaknesses. 
Sun Tzu asserts that, “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”.19 
However, considering the Chinese perspective, conflict may actually be preferred in some 
occasions. Further research shows that the idealized vision of subduing the enemy without battle 
is not, according to Ian Johnston, the prevailing theme of the Chinese strategic culture. He argues 
that there is a Chinese historical inclination for a grand strategy of “absolute flexibility”, 
revealing a preference for offensive violence over static defense.
20
 For Andrew Scobell, the “cult 
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of defense” underlines the Chinese strategic culture within a concept of “active defense”, which 
emphasizes a defensive posture, but actually blurs the distinction between offence and defense.
21
 
This study envisions future warfare as a fusion of characteristics, where the US approach, as 
the dominant player, will be confronted with multi-dimensional, asymmetric attacks, spanning 
social, political, and economic domains. However, the central operational motivation will shift 
from destroying enemy forces to shaping the effects in public opinion. Although this approach 
may be wielded by any contender, it is especially effective when used by non-state actors and 
emerging peer competitors who are not bounded by the legal, moral, and institutional constraints 
of a liberal democracy.  
Therefore, future will bring a shift in warfare function. While US objectives are “redefining 
war on our terms”22 using technology and overwhelming military power to compel the adversary 
to submit one’s will, other adversaries will use “all means, including armed force or non-armed 
force, military and non-military, lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept 
one’s interests”.23 This holistic approach to warfare considers both state and non-state actors 
seeking to reduce their military inferiority over stronger opponents, in particular the US. By 
promoting a “beyond the limits” confrontation, it orchestrates all the measures required to fight a 
stronger opponent. It is a synergic employment of unrestricted measures, but with limited 
objectives. Changing the emphasis from military to political, economical, information and 
cultural engagements, it blurs the distinction between war and peace. Moreover, it seeks to 
paralyze the adversary’s combat effectiveness, by collapsing government organizations, and 
disrupting the normal flow of advanced societies. As an immediate consequence, the military-
technical dimension of war is no longer the most important one. Rather, warfare has expanded to 
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include the fields of diplomacy, economics, finance, cybernetics, media, and information. This 
comprehensive vision of war leads to asymmetric tactics aimed at destroying the Western state’s 
center of gravity: its liberal values.
24
 
The fragility and interdependence of the world economy, the vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructures, and the growing dependency on the internet expand future warfare into non-
lethal and non-military domains. Nonetheless, force projection can be achieved through methods 
such as trade embargoes, currency devaluation, cyber attacks, and hostile takeovers from 
sovereign wealth funds. Through the use of non-lethal force it is possible to spread disruption 
and panic, such as the case of the anthrax threat in Washington DC.
25
 The World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon attacks unleashed the lethal potential of such methods. 
This apparent lack of coherence and integration of such methods will be overcome, allowing 
in the future an orchestrated employment of unrestricted methods to achieve limited objectives. 
Various state and non-state actors are repeatedly probing in these domains. Even though there 
are no current explicit indications of the willingness of a nation-state to employ this strategy in 
an orchestrated manner, there have been several instances of individual actions utilizing these 
methods. For example, after the collision of a US surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter plane, 
several hackers defaced dozens of US military web sites.
26
 Another event refers that pro-Russian 
computer hackers have been blamed over the last few years for cyber attacks against Estonia and 
Georgia.
27
 Moreover, the US National Defense Strategy acknowledges that “China is developing 
technologies to disrupt our traditional advantages. Examples include development of anti-
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satellite capabilities and cyber warfare”.28 As an evidence of this, in 2007, China successfully 
used a missile to destroy an orbiting satellite. 
Hence, the importance of information will increase, as an enabler, a weapon, and a target. 
The improved surveillance and targeting capabilities, the media manipulation, and the disruption 
of networks are all faces of the same dimension. For example, it is difficult to imagine how the 
US forces would operate without GPS or communications. Additionally, the cited example of the 
cyber attacks against Estonia shows how disturbing and effective they can be.
29
 
This approach to warfare is neither new, nor identical to past strategies. What is new and 
different today is the global reach of adversaries, enabled by advanced information technology.  
Although actors, motivations, and technologies have existed in past wars, the current and future 
advances in science and technology will continuously empower a new breed of fighters, relying 
on the impact that the few can have on the many. What seems certain is the tendency of 
increasing destructiveness in smaller units, growing the possibility for disruption of society, 
using weapons of mass effects, either kinetic or non-kinetic. Moreover, the operational 
usefulness of super empowered individuals, such as hackers, terrorists, or financiers, could 
reinforce the powerful linkage between the tactical and strategic levels of war. Hence, state 
actors will definitely lose the monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence, and the growing 
civilianization of war will increasingly blur the distinction between war and peace. 
This holistic view addresses “old” forms of combat in a dangerous “new” ways. 
Consequently, the fundamental question for future strategists is finding the appropriate balance 
between “old” and “new” ways to counter this form of warfare. The study of warfare theories 
and how warfare effects the organizations, technologies, and employment of forces helps 
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understanding the way adversaries think, and act, allowing the development of an effective 
counter strategy. Such studies about the nature and character of future warfare are increasingly 
forging the intellectual foundations of tomorrow’s warfighters and decision-makers.  
In conclusion, why should future warfare be different from the past? Because context 
matters! The next decade will accentuate the interaction of globalization and technology 
diffusion which will impact warfare’s diversity, affordability, and effectiveness. However, 
technology will not change the nature of war. Chance and uncertainty will be present while two 
belligerents inflict punishment into each other. But the way to inflict punishment has been 
changing and it will change the character of warfare.
30
 While the nature of future warfare will 
remain the same, it will reveal the fusion of US’s warfighting characteristics with a more 
innovative adversary’s trinity of means, methods, and actors. On one hand, the decisiveness of 
the military instrument; the centrality of technology; the casualty aversion; and the tendency to 
wage war as an autonomous endeavor. On the other hand, the growing importance of 
information, the holistic methods, and the super empowered individuals will finally push warfare 
to different domains, redefining perhaps its function… 
In the future, it is the ability to impose will, not the level of violence, which will eventually 
lead to a better peace. 
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